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Abstract 
 
Can public campaign financing produce meaningful gains in competition within state legislative 
elections?  A number of studies have confronted this question by employing a multitude of 
analytical techniques.  This analysis adds to that body of work by taking a comparative approach 
that utilizes two distinct measures of competition in order to gauge the success of six different 
public financing programs in promoting a competitive atmosphere in state elections from 1994 to 
2010.  I find that the success of a public financing regime is entirely context dependent.  Full 
funding programs do best in promoting competition in states with highly professionalized 
legislatures while partial funding programs tend to succeed in states with lower levels of 
professionalism.  As a result, public financing should not be viewed as a singular solution to any 
competition deficit in U.S. elections.  However, these arrangements can help to bolster 
competition in state legislative races when applied in the correct context.   
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In 1974 President Gerald Ford signed into a law a series of amendments to the Federal Election 
Campaign Act (FECA).  These amendments, a response to the caustic public backlash against the 
depreciating realties of American politics that had surfaced during the 1972 election, represent 
the first truly concerted national attempt to limit the influence of money in U.S. elections 
(Fleishman 1975).  Generally, there has been a growing desire to continue this regulatory trend 
in the interest of limiting the perceived role that moneyed and special interests play in 
determining legislative outcomes.  The list of states utilizing campaign finance regulation has 
only grown since 1974 and, as calls for reform become more vocal, it will likely continue to do 
so.  However, due to a series of complex, vague, and often times contradictory Supreme Court 
rulings regarding the legality of campaign regulation, reformers have been forced to pursue more 
positive approaches to promoting healthy and competitive elections that go beyond limiting the 
quantity of special interest monies.1  
 Public campaign financing is often touted as the most viable solution to this dilemma and 
this has led to its relatively widespread implementation throughout the states. Supporters of this 
idea see two general benefits coming out of this type of reform. First, it is often argued that by 
financing campaigns with taxpayer dollars, candidates have less incentive to rely on large donors 
for backing (Malbin 2005). By diversifying the sources of money, candidates can have the option 
to turn away from the special interests and instead cater to the public ones. Ultimately, this 
should lead to more equitable elections, a reduction in the amount of time that candidates need to 
spend on fundraising, and more time for officeholders to concern themselves with their elective 
duties. The second ostensible benefit coming out of public financing is the increase in electoral 
competition (Mayer, Werner, and Williams 2006; Malhorta 2008). As barriers to entry would be 
reduced via the allocation of what is essentially “free money”, much of the costs of running for 
                                                          
1 See, for instance, Buckley v. Valeo (1976) (which sanctioned unlimited campaign expenditures while still 
upholding the legality of mandatory contribution limits), McConell v. Federal Election Commission (2003), Randall 
v. Sorrell (2006), Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life (2007), Davis v. Federal Election 
Commission (2008), Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2008), and Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. 
Bennett (2011). These rulings, among others, collectively represent the lack of a concerted and clear legal 
precedence.  
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office would be negated which would give rise to a more diverse field of challengers. 
Theoretically, this would also result in a higher rate of turnover, as entrenched incumbents would 
be met with, and forced to respond to, viable and well-financed opponents.  That electoral 
turnover can bring fresh blood and new vision into a political process that the public tends to 
view as stagnate.  The threat of turnover can also make the less viable incumbents more 
responsive to the public will.  
 Over the years, a number of different public financing arrangements have existed in state 
elections giving some evidence to their increasing popularity as a feasible option for reform.  
Matching fund systems were among the first to be enacted in the mid-1970s in the aftermath of 
Watergate.  These programs, which were implemented by state legislatures in Wisconsin and 
Minnesota, employ a partial funding scheme whereby candidates who agree to spending limits 
can get a certain percentage of that limit in public money.  The other general classification of 
public financing is full funding systems where candidates get the entirety of their campaign 
expenses covered after agreeing not to take any private money.  These systems tend to be more 
comprehensive and require candidates to prove their viability by raising a certain amount of 
contributions (normally in $5 dominations each) in order to receive full funding.  These two 
general classifications – full and partial funding – can be financed in a variety of ways including 
offering tax-check offs, deductions, or other tax incentives to the public in order to maintain a 
sizeable pool of disbursable funds. 
 The political popularity of these types of reforms cannot be doubted.  Whether this fact is 
evidenced through the more than half a dozen pieces of campaign finance legislation sitting in 
Congress as of February 2013 or the public recoil in response to the Citizens United vs. FEC 
(588 U.S. 310) ruling, it should be clear that more and more states will begin to consider reforms 
in the future.  New York’s governor, Andrew Cuomo, has recently called for legislation to be 
drafted that would implement a statewide matching funds system based of the program currently 
in place in New York City (Hakim 2013).  But can these programs prove to be effective at what 
they set out to do while minimizing the large potential for unintended consequences that tends to 
come with reforms of such large proportions? 
 There is still no academic consensus on the true effects and unintended consequences of 
public campaign financing.  It is still unclear of whether or not these programs can overcome the 
incentive structures that support the funneling of private money into campaigns. Detractors argue 
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that the allegations of money’s corrupting influence in politics are often overblown, as ideology 
and constituency needs play a far greater role in determining a politician’s voting patterns than 
does special interest alignment (Samples 2006; Levitt 1994). Other detractors argue that these 
systems actually enforce the status quo and make races even less competitive (Lott 2006).  
However, despite this lack of consensus, numerous states and municipalities have moved 
forward with public financing reforms; and as a result, a new field of research, ripe for analysis 
and consensus building, has been planted.  
 Existing public finance laws tend be very state-specific and work in different ways to 
achieve to similar goals. This implies that reformers must seek the right combination of rules and 
regulations that foster the highly desired electoral dynamism while minimizing the potential to 
produce negative and unintended side effects.  What follows is a look at the advantages and 
associated costs of a number of public financing schemes and an attempt to determine which, if 
any, are producing positive gains in electoral competiveness on a statewide basis. While 
competiveness is not necessarily the primary goal of public financing programs, this analysis 
avoids the ongoing debate surrounding the uncertainty regarding the true nature of money’s role 
in elections and political decision-making.2  Electoral competition is valuable as an end in and of 
itself, and any associated increases in contestability should be viewed as advantageous regardless 
of one’s stance regarding the role of money in elections. Reducing the prominence of money 
should not be the primary goal of finance reform due to the uncertainty surrounding its effects, 
the Constitutional barriers, and the political costs associated with implementing such a plan. 
However, policy makers and constituents, on both sides of the ideological spectrum, should view 
promoting healthy levels of competition as a worthwhile pursuit that will ultimately engender a 
more equitable and sustainable American democracy.  
 The following seeks to find the systemization and conditions which make public 
financing a viable option for boosting competiveness in state elections.  Part I of this analysis 
consists of a look at the evolution of public financing in the U.S. in order to understand why it 
has become a popular reform pursuit in the past decades.  After a discussion of the historical 
implications, the literature review will describe the work that has been done on the topic of 
public financing and identify the gaps that exist in research. Part III constructs the framework of 
                                                          
2 For comprehensive insight into the debate surrounding the role of money in politics see, among others, Levitt 
(1994), Smith (1996), Abramowitz (1988), Erikson and Palfrey (1993), Jacobson (1978), and Souraf (1988). 
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the experiment that has been designed to fill these gaps.  The final part of the analysis explains 
the results and the implications that the findings have the reform effort at large. 
 Overall this analysis finds that public financing can indeed produce gains in electoral 
competition, however these results are very context dependent.  Full public financing works best 
in states that have a highly professionalized legislature while partial funding does best in states 
that are closer to the median of state legislative professionalism.  Of the six public financing 
states that are considered in this analysis, Minnesota, Arizona, and Connecticut have programs 
that do the best in promoting competition while the programs in Maine, Wisconsin, and Hawaii 
fail to produce the expected gains in competition.  
 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC FINANCING 
 
 American political discourse can almost always be framed in the context of two 
fundamental, and sometimes conflicting, notions: liberty versus equality.  Nearly every public 
debate from healthcare to tax reform can be framed using this dichotomy.  This clash of ideals is 
not always apparent on the surface of the more practical discourse, but the underlying 
philosophical debate in these arguments is almost always grounded in these two seemingly 
exclusive ideas.  However, the debate over campaign finance regulation and public financing is 
different in that it is overtly framed as a tradeoff between liberty and equality.  It is a fight 
between those who wish to prevent the restrictions on the political use of money and those who 
wish to hinder the translation of uneven economic power into uneven political power (Mutch 
1988, 53).  The goal of this analysis is not to take a definitive stance in support of either side, but 
rather to take campaign finance regulation (specifically, public financing) as a given in order to 
understand its impact on the electoral system.  But implicit in that statement is the need to 
understand the background and evolution process that has led to current financing strictures.  It is 
only when one manages to build a formative understanding of the currents of debate and its 
historical underpinnings that a true, fair, and balanced path to reform can be made visible. 
 It is not difficult for one to look at the current state of U.S. political campaigning and 
make the assumption that the perversity of money in politics is an entirely modern phenomenon 
brought about by huge corporate conglomerates, the growing costs of campaigning, and the 
vociferous media coverage of elections. However, it needs to be noted that this crisis of money in 
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politics has been an omnipresent factor throughout U.S. history and that public financing of 
elections is a relatively new phenomenon that came to fruition as way to overcome the legal 
impositions that barred spending limits in elections.  Prior to the aforementioned FECA and the 
subsequent amendments, there was a complete lack of any substantive regulations in place that 
either limited or even monitored spending and contribution levels in elections (Smith 1996, 
1052).  The early days of American campaigning were characterized by aristocratic political 
associations, were who you knew, and who could recommend you, carried far more weight in 
determining the success of your bid for office then the amount of money you could muster for 
campaigning or your ability to appeal to the public.  Because of this, combined with the practical 
difficulties associated with campaigning (it took days to travel between cities), regulation was 
not even a point of consideration as it simply made no sense at that time.     
 This all began to change with the explosive post-Civil War growth of the industrialized 
north which caused the donor backed party financing system of today to take root.  Political 
access was the key to much of the success of the corporate barons, and donations to candidates 
were seen as a profitable investments.  These vast sums of new money in elections coupled with 
the traditional and antiquated mediums of campaigning (catering to the public) made for a one 
sided battle between interests, and the only way one could obtain office was to appeal to the 
corporate interests. For instance, despite Theodore Roosevelt’s progressive attitudes towards 
trust busting and regulation, seventy four percent of his 1904 presidential election fund was 
made up of corporate donations (Mutch 1988, 3).  This widespread corporate influence in 
elections produced public contempt of the political process; and with that came concerted efforts, 
mainly in state governments, to enact the nation’s first wave of campaign finance reform. 
The trend of reform legislation during this period was focused more on disclosure 
requirements instead of concerted efforts to remove the corporate influence from politics, like 
public financing attempts to do.  However, the first piece of public financing legislation was 
introduced in Congress in 1904 indicating at least a nominal interest in more substantive reform 
beyond disclosure requirements (Smith 1996, 1055).  Despite the effort to move towards 
regulating election financing and removing embedded corporate entities from politics, these 
initiatives largely proved fruitless as they were ineffective at preventing corporate monies from 
continuing to influence election outcomes.  Large donations continued to be the primary source 
of campaign money throughout the twentieth century, except for a few notable examples like 
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Barry Goldwater’s 1964 campaign for president where he managed to cultivate a fairly large and 
diverse donor base.  
Prior to 1971 a number of politicians would occasionally champion some variety of 
public financing, but their efforts never gained the momentum needed to produce concrete 
legislation.  However, this began to change in the late sixties in the aftermath of Hubert 
Humphrey’s dramatic loss to Richard Nixon in the 1968 election which burdened the Democratic 
Party with nearly nine million dollars of debt (Mutch 1988, 119).  Without a man in the White 
House, the Democrats where severely limited in their options for fundraising, especially 
compared to Nixon and the Republicans who had a sizeable war chest backed by large donors 
like Clemet Stone who donated $2.8 million to the Nixon campaign in 1968 (Smith 1996, 1055).  
To solve this issue a number of Democratic legislators in Congress began pushing for a federal 
system of public financing for elections.  Public campaign financing was generally a Democratic 
cause, and continues to be so, due in part to this practical reason regarding their troubles with 
fundraising, but also due to the philosophical arguments of leveling the playing field in the 
interest of bringing equality to elections.  Republicans, generally, do not see much practical 
value in public financing and have a general distaste of spending taxpayer dollars to expand the 
government’s role in regulating (Mutch 1988, 119).  In 1971 the Democrats brought a public 
financing amendment to the floor to be considered as part of an administrative tax bill.  After 
three days of contentious debate, the rider was shot down by the Republicans due in part to 
Nixon’s insistence that such a measure would never pass his desk.  Much of the reform effort 
pushing towards public financing was stifled in the early 1970s simply because of the 
Republican filibuster in the Senate and the lack of public support for such measures. 
Despite Nixon’s intransigence on the subject, he was ultimately responsible for the 
passage of the nation’s first public financing act as well as the most stringent national campaign 
finance regulations.  When the Watergate scandal broke it sent shockwaves throughout the nation 
as light was shed on Nixon’s large cooperate contributions, his reciprocal favors and his other 
illicit activities leading up to the 1972 election.  This provided the momentum needed to rocket 
campaign finance reform through Congress (Smith 1996, 1055).  The Federal Election Campaign 
Act (FECA) amendments were passed in 1974, after Congress overrode President Ford’s veto.  
Congress essentially gave a set of teeth to the original FECA of 1971 by limiting personal 
spending of candidates, placing caps on overall spending levels, limiting independent spending 
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by outside groups – all in addition to setting up a public finance system for presidential races 
(Mutch 1988, 127).  The Presidential Election Campaign Fund (PECF), as it was called, was 
funded through an income tax-check off which taxpayers could allocate three of their dollars to 
go to the public financing fund which would match candidates’ spending with tax payer dollars 
up to a certain limit.  The PECF was utilized by every single major presidential candidate from 
1976 to 2008 when Barrack Obama opted out of subjecting himself to spending limits as his 
record breaking campaigning strategy brought in donations that dwarfed the amount of money 
that he would have been given via the PECF (FEC 2013).    
The FECA amendments, the most rigorous set of regulations ever imposed on campaigns 
and elections, caused a great deal of consternation among a number of interests including 
conservatives, libertarians, as well as the leaders of businesses, corporations, and unions alike.  A 
group of three diverse individuals including Senator James Buckley (NY) of the Conservative 
Party, retired Senator Eugene McCarthy (D-MN), and the director of the New York Civil 
Liberties Union Ira Glasser came together to challenge the new law and its constitutionality.  The 
opposition proceeded to take their case to the courts with a syllogistic libertarian argument 
against the imposition of spending limits arguing that if money is speech and restricting speech 
violates the First Amendment, therefore restricting political spending violates the first 
amendment.   In 1975 Buckley et al. v. Valeo et al. (the defendant being Francis Valeo, secretary 
of the Senate, who was charged with administering the law) made it to the Supreme Court.  In 
early 1976 the Court released a per curiam decision that upheld contribution caps, the public 
financing program and the disclosure requirements while striking down limits on overall 
campaign spending including spending by individual candidates and spending on behalf of 
candidates.  Justice Byron White believed the entirety of the law should have been upheld 
arguing: 
 
It would make little sense to me, and apparently made none to Congress, to limit the 
amounts an individual may give to a candidate or spend with his approval but fail to limit 
the amounts that could be spent on his behalf. Yet the Court permits the former while 
striking down the latter limitation. No more than $1,000 may be given to a candidate or 
spent at his request or with his approval or cooperation; but otherwise, apparently, a 
 9 
contributor is to be constitutionally protected in spending unlimited amounts of money in 
support of his chosen candidate or candidates. (Buckley v. Valeo 1976)  
 
This whole issue of limiting contributions while at the same time permitting unlimited outside 
spending does call into question the effectiveness of the now neutered FECA at actually limiting 
the influence of money in elections.  However, it was Justice Potter Stewart who coined the 
adage that succinctly summarizers the FECA challengers’ position: “We are talking about 
speech, money is speech and speech is money, whether it is buying television or radio time or 
newspaper advertising.” (Buckley v. Valeo 1976, oral arg., 24).  Since political communications 
(speech) require the expenditure of funds to reach target audiences, limiting a candidate’s ability 
to spend money essentially amounts to a violation of the first amendment.  Buckley v. Valeo is 
unquestionably the landmark case in the campaign finance reform debate as it established the 
legal precedent that forbids strictures on spending in elections both on the national and state 
levels.  Despite this stricture there is still a significant portion of the public, and elected officials, 
who view campaign spending limits as the most viable method for removing the perceived threat 
of excessive money in politics (Smith 1995, 1056). This has pushed reformers to utilize public 
campaign financing as a proxy, or legislative workaround, to spending limits, as limits can only 
be imposed on candidates as a condition for receiving public monies.  This fact can describe the 
reasons behind public financing’s rise to the preferred method of limiting money’s role in 
politics.    
 But how well can public financing lead to another desired legislative goal and how 
precisely does it impact competition?  As campaign costs along with the role of PACs have 
increased significantly since the 1970s, the support behind curbing expenditures has grown 
(Saad, 2010).   This push has come into direct confrontation with the legacy of Buckley v. Valeo 
and a number of regulatory programs, including the McCain Feingold Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2002, have been neutered or overturned completely due to their overstepping the 
limitations imposed by the legal precedent established by the Buckley decision.3   
In addition to the legal issues there are a number of administrative problems associated 
with public financing that makes it difficult to institutionalize a system that effectively collects 
                                                          
3 See Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett (2011), Davis v. Federal Election Commission (2008), Citizens 
United v FEC (2008). 
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funds from tax payers, monitors candidate spending, and disburses the money to candidates all 
while staying within the boundaries set up by Buckley.  There needs to be considerable support 
of the program coming from the public, the officials administering the program and the 
candidates running for election in order to make public campaign financing work.  Because so 
much needs to be backing public financing, the perennial question has been whether or not the 
costs of administering the program and the threats to its legal validity are worth any associated 
gains coming from this workaround to the state’s inability to impose spending limits.  This has 
pushed scholars to focus their attention on public financing’s impact on electoral competition 
and a sizeable corpus of work has been produced as a result. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 Electoral competition has been a popular, yet decidedly controversial, topic in the field of 
political science.  However, there have been a number of key, and agreed upon, findings that 
have large implications for this study.  Incumbency and challenger quality have been identified 
as crucial determinants of competition.  Incumbents enjoy a number institutional and visibility 
advantages that make running for reelection far easier and therefore less competitive then a race 
for an open seat (King and Gelman 1991).  This incumbency advantage stems from a number of 
potential sources including name recognition (Hood and McKee 2010), district and constituent 
services (Cain, Ferejoin and Fiorina 1987) and earmark spending (Levitt and Synder 1997).  
While the majority of the competition literature is focused around Congressional level races and 
outcomes, these are still pertinent findings that have implications for analyzing down-ballot 
races.  Candidate quality is also a key determinate of competition as only quality challengers will 
attempt to dislodge an incumbent and high-quality incumbents tend to deter challengers 
(Ashworth and de Mesquita 2008). However, in state level elections where visibility is one of the 
greatest problems facing challengers and being a quality will not necessarily bolster one’s 
visibility, simply due to the lack of public awareness surrounding races for state legislative seats.  
The implications of these findings are significant for the study of public campaign financing.  A 
lot of the literature surrounding the analysis of public campaign financing is focused around the 
study of competition and how it affects challengers and incumbents alike. 
 11 
 Much of the research on this matter has been centered on the public financing programs 
in place in Wisconsin and Minnesota, as they are the nation’s oldest, having been established in 
1978 and 1976 respectively. Minnesota’s partial funding system gives candidates access to 
public money worth up to 50% of the imposed spending limit, which changes, with each 
election. The state also offers a donor rebate program that gives contributors refunds for 
donations below $50.  A number of studies have found that the system in place in Minnesota is 
relatively successful in increasing competition (Donnay and Ramsden, 1995; Mayer and Wood 
1995; Mayer, Warner and Wood 2003, Gleason et al. 2010).  However, while there is a 
consensus amongst these studies as to the general positive effect of Minnesota’s program, there 
is significant amount of divergence in terms of the mechanisms through which Minnesota’s 
system operates produce this competition.  Mayer and Wood found that the key factor behind 
this competition boost is not the actually matching funds system in Minnesota but rather the 
donor rebate program whereby donors are refunded up to $50 for a political contribution to a 
candidate (Mayer and Wood 1995).  They argued that the rebate program increased the amount 
of small donor contributions, especially among minorities, creating a more diverse pool of 
competitors.  However, Donnay and Ramsden found that there were only marginal gains in 
competition for Minnesota and if the matching funds program were to be expanded, then races 
would become far more competitive (Donnay and Ramsden 1995, 364).  
 Smith looked at the systems of public financing in place in both Minnesota and Wisconsin 
and found that the “price floors” that these systems implement have a perverse effect on 
competition (1996).  The author attributes this to a number of faulty incentive schemes that could 
render private spending as meaningless, remove monitoring incentives via complacency, and 
could potentially encourage bribery (Smith 1996, 1090).  Smith argues that systems where 
transparency is the only requirement do far better in promoting healthy elections than any other 
tangible changes to the legal structure (1996, 1089). Lott has also studied the effects of campaign 
finance regulation on electoral competition and found that races became less competitive after 
limits where put into place (2006).  This is important to note as all of the public financing 
systems in this study implement some form of spending limits as a condition for receiving public 
money.  The author concluded from this that public campaign financing essentially amounts to 
an incumbency protection act (2006, 299). 
  Primo, Milyo and Groseclose challenged the general conclusion of both Lott and Smith’s 
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work and found that campaign contribution limits are the only form of regulation that provides 
any gains to electoral competition (2006).  The authors also looked at the public financing 
programs available for gubernatorial candidates in a number of states and compared the 
competition levels in those elections to the rest of country. The authors found that public 
financing confers “no statistically or substantively significant” benefit to competitiveness in 
gubernatorial elections from 1978 to 2004 (Lott 2006, 280).  However this study is problematic 
as it only assesses gubernatorial elections, which is a relatively small sample compared to 
legislative elections.  More importantly, races for governor are far more visible to the public and 
therefore a more susceptible to exogenous factors that differ greatly between candidates and 
races.  For instance candidate participation in public financing tends to be low in races for 
governor mainly due to the ease of raising money (due to high visibility) and the subsequent 
unwillingness that candidates have to subject themselves to spending limits.  This lack of 
participation coupled with a greater emphasis on the nuances of each candidate in gubernatorial 
elections make comparison difficult and impairs the researchers’ ability to isolate the effects of 
spending and, more specifically, public financing. 
 Maine and Arizona are two other states that have also been very popular research targets in 
past years. This is due mainly to their unique clean elections laws, which fully subsidize 
candidates who agree to expenditure limits. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was 
mandated to conduct a study in 2003 on these new programs and found that their impact on 
electoral competition was negligible (2010). However, a study by Mayer, Werner, and Williams 
questioned the measures employed by the GAO as well their predisposition towards political bias 
and took another look at competition in Maine, Arizona, Minnesota, Wisconsin and Hawaii 
(2006). This study measured competition along a three-dimensional metric that looked at 
competiveness (measured by vote distributions), contestation, and reelection rates. The authors 
found that Arizona and Maine experienced appreciable increases in competition after the clean 
election laws were implemented and that Minnesota’s program was highly efficacious were as 
Hawaii and Wisconsin’s were less so. This was by far the most comprehensive study on public 
financing done up to that point in time as it looked across a broad spectrum of states that 
employed variable types of funding systems and used a more dynamic measure of competiveness 
to gauge outcomes. Despite this there were a number of flaws with the data used. Namely the 
effects of public financing where likely to be overstated in Arizona (where they were shown to 
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be highest) due to the imposition of term limits which coincided with the new regulation (Primo, 
Milyo and Groseclose 2006). These term limits brought about a culling effect that removed a 
large number of long serving state legislators from office leaving only relatively inexperienced 
and less competitive incumbents. Since only two clean elections had taken place in Arizona by 
the time Mayer, Warner and Wood conducted their study, it is difficult to distinguish the effects 
of term limits from that of the new regulation.  
 A study done by Malhorta used a number of complex regression techniques to gauge 
competition and concluded that there was a positive impact on electoral competition coming 
mainly out of the elimination of entrance costs facing challengers (2008). Malhorta’s study is 
notable due to the unique measures that he employed in gauging competition, most important of 
which was his use of the inverse of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI-1), which is normally 
used in economics to gauge market concentration. Malhorta adopted the HHI-1 to gauge 
competition by treating candidates as firms and distributing their vote share along a continuum 
that ranks candidates based on their effectiveness. He also used a number of traditional measures 
of competition (i.e. vote margins and candidate quality) in addition to the HHI-1 to provide a 
clear picture of how competition varies with public financing programs. However, Malhorta’s 
design was severely limited as he utilized only a single year of election data to assess the impact 
of the clean election programs, making it difficult to determine whether the stated effects were 
significant or the result of time trends. It also suffered from the same difficulties experienced by 
Mayer, Warner and Wood in distinguishing the impact of public finance from that of term limits 
(2006).  
 Recent studies have begun to turn their attention towards Connecticut’s new clean election 
program that was implemented in 2008. Because the state is a relatively new addition to the 
clean election family there has been little time, and even less data, from which to draw 
conclusions about its effectiveness. However, some facts have been made apparent regarding the 
potential of the program that are relevant for this analysis. The National Institute of Money in 
State Politics, a bipartisan organization that looks at campaign finance throughout the states, 
conducted a study of Connecticut’s program and found that candidate participation has been high 
(94.4% in the Senate and 76.6% in the House) which presents a solid opportunity for analysis 
(Gleason et al 2010, 18). Three elections have taken place in Connecticut since the 
implementation of clean election laws, which has created a time series which can effectively be 
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studied. 
 In recent years a number of these extant programs have undergone serious changes that 
have yet to be studied. Wisconsin and Minnesota both effectively ended their public financing 
programs due budgetary constraints and a portion of Arizona’s clean election laws were struck 
down by the Supreme Court in 2011.4 While a setback for the public financing movement as 
whole, the elimination of these programs has provided breaks in the time series where research 
can now analyze how competition has changed since the reversion back to pre-reform laws. 
 On top of the research gaps, there tends to be a lack of discussion regarding the potentially 
confounding variables that influence competition. In addition to the problems surrounding term 
limits outlined above, redistricting imposes a significant barrier to understanding how electoral 
competition arises. Districts are often created by partisan legislatures who have incentive to draw 
uncompetitive districts. This would understandably present a challenge in trying to distinguish 
the role of public financing in state level elections and any studying looking into the effects of 
public financing on competition must take redistricting into account.  
 Another issue with the extant literature is that there has been no comprehensive assessment 
of the different systems that are in place across state borders. The studies that have done cross-
state comparisons tend to use a dichotomous scale for public finance (public financing is present 
or not present) (Francia and Herrnson 2003). By not looking at the factors that distinguish these 
programs as unique - like organization, financial backing, and legislative support - it is not 
unreasonable to assume that these studies can be very misleading.  More needs to be done to 
understand the specific nuances of each program and only then we can truly understand what 
programs work in specific contexts. 
 There is still much to be done in this field and this study looks to find an adequate 
methodology that can fill in much of the missing information in hopes of providing a 
comprehensive assessment of public financing’s impact on state-level elections. The literature 
has tended to indicate that public financing can be successful in fostering competition under 
certain circumstances.  Adequate subsidization of candidate expense in the form of matching 
funds and implementing transparency requirements seem to be the most plausible sources of 
electoral competition. This analysis, by breaking public financing down to its component parts 
and analyzing programs across space and time, attempts to identify why that is the case.  This 
                                                          
4 See Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett (2011) 
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study will strive to fill the critical gap in the literature by utilizing a comparative approach to the 
study of public financing and judge the effectiveness of each states program.   
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The key question that is focused on here in this paper is whether public financing is 
conducive to a healthy level of competition in state level legislative elections.  The second part is 
focused around trying to understand what specific characteristics or arrangements of public 
financing laws lead to the greatest gains (or losses) in competition.  To achieve these two goals, a 
comprehensive approach to the study of these financing regimes is required.  This analysis will 
attempt to overcome the limitations of the extant literature by utilizing a comparative approach to 
the study of inter-state policy differences by using a large data set in tandem with OLS 
regression analysis to identify any potential relationships that may exist between public financing 
and electoral competition. The strategy here is multipronged: first, a ranking system must be 
established in order to identify the financing program that is best suited to promoting 
competition, and second, this analysis attempts to explain why that particular combination of 
rules is so successful compared to the alternatives. 
 
Hypotheses  
This study hypothesizes that the clean election programs in place in Arizona, Connecticut 
and Maine will be the most effective in promoting electoral competition as they go the furthest 
with implementing disclosure, grant allocations, and limits.  These are by far the most 
comprehensive programs in place and they do the most to actually regulate the elections.  The 
“catchup funds” that these programs offered in the past, where challengers who were being 
outspent by their privately financed counterparts could get public money to fill that gap, do a lot 
to even the playing field and allow the disparity between candidates to shrink.  These programs 
also have relatively high participation rates meaning that more candidates are willingly 
subjecting themselves to spending limits in the interest of obtaining public money (Gleason et al 
2010, 12). We also see that these programs continue to be well funded through the taxpayer 
check off systems in place, meaning that there is a substantial pool of money from which 
candidates can draw from.  However, it is the fact that these programs offer full financing that 
 16 
provides the most backing for this hypothesis, as through this, candidates have the entirety of 
their campaign expenditures covered by the program allowing for generous coverage as well as 
increased accessibility for candidates who have less visibility when going up against an 
incumbent.  
The program in place in Minnesota is predicted to be moderately successfully in 
encouraging competition, due to the unique structure of the donor incentive program in place.  
Minnesota offers rebates that cover the full costs of political donations to candidates.  This is a 
new positive approach to incentivizing competition, as those who would be unwilling or unable 
to make donations can now do so for free, this gives money-strapped candidates the option to 
cater towards a more diverse pool of donors.  That pool of donors consists of a variety of 
traditional and non-traditional donors who would support a far more diverse number of 
candidates allowing for greater competition to occur. The program in Minnesota also gives 
partial funding in the form of grants up to 50% of the spending limit (~$15,000 for the House 
and ~$30,000 for the Senate), and while this program does not go as far as Maine, Arizona or 
Connecticut, it can still succeed in assisting candidates who would otherwise struggle to mount 
even a nominal challenge to an entrenched incumbent with vested interests behind him or her.   
The partial funding, fixed subsidy, system in Wisconsin is hypothesized to be ineffective 
due to the lack of financial backing and weak participation rates.  There is no donor rebate 
program in place in Wisconsin like there is in Minnesota and the maximum allowable grant for a 
candidate is significantly smaller than in Minnesota.  These qualities essentially make 
Wisconsin’s public financing program a non-entity. 
The partial funding system in place in Hawaii is hypothesized to be least effective of the 
six due to the limited nature of the program.  Hawaii’s public financing system is a partial 
funding grant program that allocates 15% of a district-specific spending limit.  Because 
candidates only receive 15% of the total money that they are allowed to spend, it is likely that 
fewer candidates will be encourage to participate in the program, and those that do participate are 
likely to be less viable candidates who would otherwise struggle raising such a small amount 
money (and would subsequently have no worry about bumping up against the limit).  While 
Wisconsin’s program is poorly funded and has low participation rates, Hawaii still has very high 
participation rates giving indication to the potential fact that more ineffective challengers are 
utilizing Hawaii’s program to mount challenges, potentially increasing the competition disparity 
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as these candidates are not only ineffective but also poorly financed and fighting against others 
who are of the same nature. 
To test these aforementioned hypotheses, this analysis utilizes a data set created and 
maintained by Indiana State University containing state legislative election returns from 1967 to 
2010.5  It also makes use of census data from 1994 to 2010 as well as various legislative data 
maintained by the National Council of State Legislatures.  The main unit of analysis here are 
state level legislative election for both upper and lower chamber seats.  It is in these state level 
races that candidates have higher incentive to participate in public finance programs due to the 
low visibility and associated difficulties with fundraising (Mayer, Warner and Wood 2006, 248). 
When trying to analyze the effects of public financing in national, gubernatorial, city council, or 
judicial elections the sample sized is significantly restricted due to the reduced frequency and 
quantity of elections. By utilizing state legislative elections, I can better control for the 
exogenous and endogenous factors that tend to be more prominent in the less frequent 
gubernatorial elections (Malbin 2005). In addition, state legislative elections have been a popular 
unit of analysis in past work, providing a baseline from which the findings here can be 
contextualized.6  
The overarching structure of the design is centered on a matching system that compares 
public financing states with two other control states that are void of any public financing scheme, 
yet have similar demographic, partisan, and legislative characteristics.7  This is done to control 
for the inherent difficulties associated with having to collect an absurd amount of data in order to 
infer any meaningful relationships between the variables.   
 
Table 1. Public Financing States and Their Matched Pairs  
State Type of Public Financing 
System 
Match #1 Match #2 
Arizona “Clean Elections” Idaho Florida 
Maine “Clean Elections” Montana South Dakota 
Connecticut “Clean Elections” Maryland Washington 
Minnesota Fixed Subsidy Iowa Oregon 
                                                          
5 Klarner, Carl, William Berry, Thomas Carsey, Malcolm Jewell, Richard Niemi, Lynda Powell, and James Snyder. 
State Legislative Election Returns (1967-2010). ICPSR34297-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for 
Political and Social Research [distributor], 2013-01-11. doi:10.3886/ICPSR34297.v1.  
6 See, for instance, Donnay and Ramsden (1995); Government Accountability Office (2010); Malhotra (2008); 
Mayer and Wood (1995); Mayer and Werner (2007); Mayer, Werner, and Williams (2006) 
7 For an overview of the public financings systems studied in this analysis see Appendix 1 and for an overview of 
the legislative characteristics of the public financing states in the study see Appendix 2. 
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Wisconsin Fixed Subsidy  New York Michigan 
Hawaii Matching Funds Only Alaska Colorado 
 
These matches act as a limited control group in which the inherent dissimilarities between states 
can be better minimized and any relationship between competition and public financing can be 
better understood.  This analysis looks at six states with three general types of public financing 
systems.  These states and their respective matches can be seen in Table 1. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
 The dependent variable, electoral competition, will be measured using two indicators in 
order to accurately assess how competition changes from election cycle to cycle.  There is an 
extensive body of work surrounding measuring and assessing competition in elections and there 
are certainly many ways to operationalize this variable.  A popular way to do this is to look at 
candidate quality (Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993).  However it is exceedingly difficult to 
determine and measure the qualities that make a candidate competitive in an election.  The 
majority of studies that look at candidate quality when assessing competition look at whether or 
not a particular candidate has held office in the past, as this information is the most readily 
available.  However, this study looks at state level elections where the vast majority of 
candidates have never held actually held office before.  This fact, coupled with the difficultly of 
judging a candidate’s quality, makes utilizing this measurement of competiveness impractical.     
 Looking at vote margins is the second best choice for assessing competition, as they are by 
far the easiest and most commonly used measure.  For instance, if a candidate receives 90% of 
the vote in an election (compared to a challenger’s 10%) that election can be seen as having a 
competition deficit. There is some external factor (whether it be a poor quality challenger or a 
highly partisan district) that has lead to such a disparity in the margins and, in this way, looking 
at vote margins acts as a proxy for looking at competition.  If the average margins of these races 
decreases after the implementation of a public financing program it can be reasonably inferred 
that competiveness has increased.  
 In this study vote margins is a continuous variable that is coded on a scale from 0 
(uncontested candidate) to 1 (perfect fifty-fifty split in the vote).  This measures looks 
specifically at margins within a single race, excludes third party challengers, and is defined by 
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the following equation: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑠 =  
𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 − 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡)
100
 
 
The reason for excluding third parties in this first measure of competition is due to the fact that 
margins can be skewed and very misleading when there are more than two candidates running 
for office.   However, many advocates of public financing claim that a key goal of public 
financing is to inject fresh faces into a race and often times these new challengers come in the 
form of third party candidates.  It is very difficult to judge the impact that third party candidates 
have on competition due to the issues of vote splitting leading to uncompetitive outcomes.  A 
race where three candidates run (a Democrat, Republican, and a Libertarian) and the split is 50 – 
30 – 20 would indicate a competitive election, however if the Libertarian candidate had not run 
and the split was 50 – 50 the margins would indicate a far more competitive election.  Is the 
presence of third party challenger in election indicative of more competition, or are the closer 
margins of the race with two candidates more competitive? This dilemma is circumvented in this 
analysis by dropping races with third party challengers. By narrowing the focus down to looking 
only at how incumbents are affected by these public financing initiatives this analysis can still 
adequately judge the impact on competition while minimizing the distorting effects of third party 
challengers.  
 This notion of looking at how incumbents are affected by policy changes as a proxy for 
competiveness is expanded upon by looking at a second commonly used measured of 
competition - the number of incumbents facing a major party challenger (Mayer, Warner and 
Wood 2006).  If the number of incumbents who face a major party challenger increases after the 
implementation of a particular public financing program we can infer that is now more feasible 
for a viable, major party, challenger to mount a campaign against a seated incumbent.  While this 
may or may not directly result in an increase in turnover rate it does present the threat of loss to 
entrenched incumbents who would then become more responsive to constituent demands.   
 This variable has a dichotomous operationalization where 1 indicates an incumbent who 
faced a major party challenger in an election and 0 is an uncontested incumbent.  This variable 
essentially takes incumbency as a given and it would logically follow that as more and more 
incumbents face major party challengers, competition is increasing.   This measure, when used in 
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tandem with vote margins, can give adequate insight into the dynamics of elections and how 
specific incumbents have been impacted by changes in financing legislation.  If more incumbents 
are facing more major party challengers and winning by slimmer margins (or losing) than it can 
be reasonably inferred that elections have become more competitive.  It is for this reason (that 
completion can be inferred solely through looking at incumbents) that both third party 
challengers and races for open seats are dropped from the analysis.  It is assumed that open seat 
races would provide further distortion to any results this study would find due to the greater 
propensity of third party challengers to contest an open seat and the fact that these races tend to 
be more competitive (on average) than races where an incumbent is present.   
  One setback of these measures are their inability to assess competition in multimember 
free for all (MMFFA) districts, which are present in one state in this study - Arizona. Neimi, 
Jackman, and Winsky offer a solution to this problem by creating “pseudo-single member 
districts” (1991). This method pairs candidates together according to their vote margins 
essentially turning these MMFFA races into a number of single race elections.  This method has 
been utilized in order to create matching pairs within the data set which has made comparison 
possible.  
 
Independent Variables 
 
 With the two measures of competition identified, a number of independent variables need 
to be clearly defined and operationalized.  Because there are a host of different factors that can 
potentially have an impact on competition in state elections, the model used in this study 
includes three broad categories of independent variables, which are the race, state, and public 
financing identifiers.   
 The race-specific identifiers consists of those variables that define, characterize, and are 
unique to a specific race.  These include incumbent presence, party affiliation of the candidates, 
and a dummy that accounts for any potential presidential coattail effects.  These variables were 
included in the model in order to define specific races so the factors that impact competition 
within the race can be better understood and distinguished from the external factors that act upon 
a race to produce competitive or uncompetitive outcomes.  While there are other variables that 
could conceivable impact competition and are specific to a single race or candidate like 
candidate quality or the presence of third party candidates, these have been disregarded for the 
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aforementioned reasons.  This study’s key focus rests on the state and institutional level in that it 
is seeking to make meaningful comparisons between state systems and not between races.  The 
specific intricacies and nuances of races and what makes them competitive is not as important 
here as the general trends across time and geographies.  If more race specific variables were to be 
included here the analysis would bog down in the details and abundance of information making 
it difficult to complete the intended project.  The information for these race-specific identifiers 
comes from the data set on state legislative election outcomes maintained by Professor Carl 
Klarner of Indiana State University while the data backing the presidential coattail dummy was 
compiled by this author.   
 The second set of independent variables are the state-specific identifiers.  These consist of 
the variables that are unique to the state legal and institutional structure, but are distinct from the 
public financing identifiers.  These include a dummy indicating the presence of term limits, party 
control of the legislature, redistricting year, and professionalism. These variables were chosen 
for this study to the fact that it these that are likely going to have the largest impact on 
competition in state level elections.   
 Term limits have a direct impact on completion as legislators are termed out regardless of 
their performance creating more open seats (which are naturally more competitive on average) 
and potentially having an interacting effect with public financing especially in Arizona and 
Maine as these two measures were implemented in the same years.  Term limits is coded as a 
simple dichotomous variable as the disparity between the lengths of term limits for the states in 
this study was negligible.   
 Redistricting can also have a profound impact on competiveness as districts can be drawn 
along partisan lines ensuring a single party’s continued dominance of that specific seat.  For the 
time period and collection of states used in this study districts were redrawn once, in 2000, so the 
variable in this study takes the form of a simple dichotomous variable that illustrates the resultant 
change after the 2000 census-mandated redistricting.   
 Partisan control of the legislature is added to help understand the resultant changes after 
redistricting as well as the general partisan alignment of the public in a particular state.  It is 
logical that if the majority elected legislators are consistently Democrats then elections would 
generally be biased towards the Democratic Party and therefore less competitive.  The question 
of whether this partisan dominance is a result of gerrymandered districts, or the partisan 
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alignment of the public, is beyond the scope of this analysis as the primary concern here is not its 
origins but its effects on competition.  The party control variable was created by this author using 
the party composition listings on the various state legislature websites.  Party control is coded as 
a continuous variable ranging from zero to one with one being the complete party domination of 
every single seat in the chamber.   
 Legislative professionalism is also of key importance when analyzing competition in state 
elections.  Professionalism is measured by the Squire Index (2007) which is a composite index of 
legislator benefits and salary, time demands, and staff resources.  It is scaled on a zero to one 
metric with one being the most professional.  Professionalism has significant implications for the 
competiveness of elections due to the fact that incumbents tend have a greater advantage in more 
professionalized legislatures (Squire 2007, 212).  While this is by no means a complete 
collection of variables that could potentially have an effect on competition in state elections, it 
does account for the main forcings that act on incumbents and challengers alike in order to alter 
competition.  Other than professionalism and the party control variable, the data on the other 
state characteristics has been compiled and maintained by the National Conference of State 
Legislatures.   
 The third set of identifiers are the main ones of interest for this study and they consist of 
the public financing variables.  These are generally dichotomous variables which are inserted to 
show the absence or presence of a certain program or policy.  There are three dummies in this set 
of variables: one acting as a general indicator for the presence of some sort of public financing 
system, the second being one indicating the presence of full funding system and the third for a 
partial funding program.  These three are the main variables of interest as these are the ones that 
vary most consistently between states.  For instance, the states that have a system of full 
financing are all clean election states that share very similar disbursement, disclosure, and 
spending requirements.  The amount of deviation in between the specifics of these programs is 
minimal and statistical analysis of the minor discrepancies between the full financing programs 
is therefore beyond the scope of this comparative analysis.  There will, however, be a discussion 
of the different intricacies of each program in the discussion portion of this analysis, however 
these will not be included in the model due to the sheer number of deviations.  For the statistical 
analysis portion of this project, the main focus is on the difference between full and partially 
funded systems.  There is also a number of other identifiers that will be analyzed and 
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incorporated into the model, including the presence of tax check-offs for political parties, tax 
incentives for donations, and donor rebate programs.  These three additional variables are 
included because they are by far the most common programs that are incorporated into public 
financing apparatuses.  For instance, much of the success that has been attributed to Minnesota’s 
public financing program is a result of their donor rebate program and not the actual partial 
financing system in place there.  By separating the variables in this manner the actual effects of 
these specific programs can be individually understood and interpreted as separate entities.   
  
The Model 
 
 Due to the fact that this study is illustrating its dependent variable using two different 
measures of electoral competition, two separate models will be used in order to estimate the 
effects of public financing programs.  The first model using margins as the dependent variables 
is as follows: 
 
(1)     𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵3𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
where marginsi,t is the level of electoral competition (illustrated by competitive margins) present 
in district i at election year t.  P represents the campaign finance identifiers, which consists of a 
series of dummies indicating the presence or absence of specific programs, which include: (i) the 
general public financing identifier, (ii) the partial funding identifier, (iii) the full financing 
identifier, (iv) tax check-offs, (v) donor subsidies, and (vi) tax incentives. R represents the race-
specific control variables which include: (i) incumbent presence, (ii) a variable indicating which 
seat the race is being fought for (upper or lower chamber), and (iii) a dummy variable that 
accounts for presidential coattail effects. S, the state-specific control variables, include: (i) the 
presence of term limits, (ii) redistricting year, and (iii) legislative characteristics (party control 
and professionalism).  Finally ε is the stochastic error term.  The second model will consist of the 
same regressors and is as follows: 
 
(2)    𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵3𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
These two models, when used in tandem, will be able to manage the potential threats to both 
internal and external validity. They will also be used in different combinations and in respect to 
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different collections of states (whether individually or in their matched group) to better 
understand the effects of public financing. 
While this is not an entirely random experiment, as the treatment of public financing is 
not applied to states on a random basis, this design can account for some of the associated threats 
to validity by using a natural experiment that employs multiple interrupted (and non-interrupted) 
time series with multiple group comparisons. By using data from all fifty states over an eighteen-
year period there is a large enough sample size from which comparisons can be drawn and the 
natural ups and downs of the historical trends can be mitigated. The legal and budgetary 
challenges that force states to remove sections of their public financing laws also impose a 
degree of randomness into the experiment (as states are not choosing to do this on their own 
volition and it is instead imposed by an external force). All in all this experiment, while not 
being completely random, can still overcome some of the associated challenges to validity.  
 
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
General Indicators and Descriptive Statistics 
 Before estimating the effects of public financing using the method of matching similar 
states to control for exogenous variables, a number of regressions will be run on the complete 
data set, including all six public financing states and the twelve control states, in order to assess 
the overall plausibility of the model.  This is also done to contextualize this study within the 
larger corpus of work surrounding public financing.  If conclusions regarding general 
comparisons are reached that are at least similar to the findings of the other study, more 
confidence can be had as the study moves into the more specific, comparative analysis.   
 Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables that have been incorporated into 
the model.  Competitive margins, is a continuous variable between zero and one, with zero 
representing an uncompetitive election where the winner garners more than 60% of the vote.  As 
the variable moves closer to one, the race between the two candidates gets closer to perfect 
competition (a fifty-fifty vote split).  The second dependent variable, incumbent challenge is the 
dichotomous variable with one indicating the presence of an incumbent who faces a major party 
challenger in his or her race.  The three dummies indicate the varying types of available public 
financing programs. The tax check off and tax incentive variables indicate, respectively, the 
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presence of programs that permit taxpayers to allocate funding to a political party of their 
choosing and the presence of programs that incentivize donations to candidates via tax rebates.  
The remainders of the independent variables are all descriptors indicating the different types of 
legislative characteristics like the presence or absence of term limits and the level of 
professionalism.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Dependent Variables     
Competitive Margins .17 .29 0 .99 
Incumbent Challenge .13 .34 0 1 
Independent Variables     
Public Financing 
(General) 
.76 .43 0 1 
Full Financing .09 .29 0 1 
Partial Funding  .15 .36 0 1 
Tax Check Off  .13 .34 0 1 
Tax Incentives .16 .37 0 1 
Chamber .23 .42 0 1 
Professionalism .26 .15 .064 .52 
Presidential Coattails .17 .37 0 1 
Term Limits .73 .44 0 1 
Redistricted .63 .48 0 1 
Party Control .23 .17 0 1 
N=37,124 
 
 Table 3 shows the results of the OLS regression analyses for all eighteen states.  Due to the 
use of dummy variables for the financing identifiers, two models were used for each dependent 
variable.  The estimates for competitive margins indicate that there is about a three percent 
reduction in average vote margins in the states that have some form of public financing in place.  
Likewise incumbents in public financing states face a major party challenger about 3.5% more 
often than in states without public financing.  Interestingly, the effect of partial funding as shown 
in specifications (2) and (3) appear to have a greater effect on competition than the systems that 
implement comprehensive full financing like the clean election programs in place in Arizona, 
Maine, and Connecticut.  While, the positive effect of public financing is in line with most of the 
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extant literature, the difference between full and partial financing programs is harder to 
contextualize due to the lack of comparative work done on the subject.  This could be due to the 
effects of the voter rebate programs in Minnesota and the nearly universal candidate participation 
rates in states with partial funding.    
 
Table 3. Results of OLS Regression Analysis Predicting Competition across Eighteen States 
 Competitive Margins  Incumbent Challenged 
 (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
Public Financing (General) .028* 
(.004) 
______ 
 
 .032* 
(.006) 
______ 
Full Financing 
 
______ 
 
.005 
(.006) 
 ______ .029 
(.007) 
Partial Funding  ______ .043* 
(.005) 
 ______ .034* 
(.006) 
Tax Check Off  
 
.02 
(.005) 
.02* 
(.005) 
 .01* 
(.006) 
.011* 
(.007) 
Tax Incentives -.024* 
(.004) 
-.01 
(.005) 
 -.05* 
(.006) 
-.057 
(.006) 
Chamber -.002 
(.003) 
-.007 
(.004) 
 -.02* 
(.004) 
.03* 
(.004) 
Professionalism -.311** 
(.01) 
-.21** 
(.011) 
 -.29** 
(.014) 
-.29** 
(.01) 
Party Control -.15* 
(.01) 
-.1* 
(.01) 
 -.04* 
(.01) 
-.05* 
(.01) 
Presidential Coattails  .002* 
(.004) 
.1* 
(.003) 
 .01* 
(.004) 
.01* 
(.004) 
Term Limits -.003* 
(.004) 
-.001 
(.004) 
 -.02* 
(.005) 
-.02 
(.005) 
Redistricted 2000 
 
.004 
(.003) 
.00 
(.003) 
 .004 
(.003) 
-.04 
(.003) 
Intercept 
 
.31* 
(.007) 
.33* 
(.03) 
 .25* 
(.04) 
-.03* 
(.04) 
R2 .03 .03  .02 .02 
*p<0.1, **p<0.01 (two-tailed tests) 
Note: standard error in parenthesis 
N=37,124 
 
 The regression also indicates that it is legislative professionalism and partisan control 
which tends to have the highest impact on competition.  This again is in line with reason as well 
as the existing literature.  It makes sense that in states where seats are more highly valued, due to 
the higher pay and more professional approach to legislating, that the incumbency advantage is 
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going to more significant leading to less competition.  Also in states where only one party 
dominates the legislature races tend to be uncompetitive due either the partisan alignment of the 
population or to uncompetitive districts being drawn.  
 The robustness of these findings was tested by rerunning the models and dropping one of 
the public financing states each time in order to ensure that the estimates were not unduly 
influenced by the occurrences within a single state.  There was a negligible amount of deviation 
between the results when this was done indicating that these findings, and the method used to 
obtain them, are resistant to scrutiny.  However a more thorough analysis is needed to arrive at 
definitive conclusions.  The above findings give credence to the model’s validity as the general 
trends are supported by the extant literature and the findings make sense within the broader 
spectrum of state politics.  The aim of the following, more specified analysis, is to provide 
answers to some of the questions raised by the general approach, specifically identifying what 
accounts for the variance between the different types of programs. 
 
Results for the Full Public Financing States 
 
 As the general models above indicate, it appears that there is more competition being 
produced by the systems of partial funding then the clean election (full funding) programs in 
Maine, Arizona, and Connecticut.  This is certainly contrary to expectations and a more thorough 
analysis is required to understand the root of this discrepancy.   
 Table 4 shows the regression analysis predicting competition in the full financing states.  
These are the three states in the analysis that utilize clean election systems for their state 
legislative races.  Out of the three, Maine appears to be the weakest at actually promoting a more 
competitive atmosphere in their elections.  Maine’s elections tend to be only marginally more 
capable of promoting competition than South Dakota and Montana which have been paired with 
Maine for analysis.   
 The clean election system in Maine was the first system that provided full public financing 
to candidates.  In order to receive public money, candidates who have opted to participate in the 
program must raise a paltry $250 ($750 in the Senate) in qualifying contributions.  This is lowest 
amount of money that a candidate must raise in order to receive full financing and this raises the 
question of whether or not this system is promoting and empowering viable candidates.  
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Garnering $250 via $5 dollar contributions is a relatively easy task, especially compared to the 
$5000 that is needed to receive public money in Connecticut and the $1050 needed in Arizona.8   
 
Table 4. Regression Analysis Predicting Competition in the Full Financing Groups 
 ME, SD, MT AZ, FL, ID CT, MD, WA 
(CM) (IC) (CM) (IC) (CM) (IC) 
Public Financing .013* 
(.008) 
.05** 
(.01) 
.05** 
(.01) 
.086** 
(.04) 
.1** 
(.013) 
.09** 
(.014) 
Chamber .013* 
(.009) 
-.05** 
(.01) 
.32 
(.01) 
.32** 
(.004) 
.04** 
(.013) 
.035* 
(.014) 
Party Control -.09** 
(.026) 
.23** 
(.03) 
-.23* 
(.11) 
-.28* 
(.01) 
-.36** 
(.06) 
-.35** 
(.067) 
Presidential Coattails .003 
(.009) 
-.02* 
(.01) 
.008 
(.01) 
.07* 
(.004) 
-.01 
(.015) 
-.014 
(.016) 
Intercept .29** 
(.007) 
.16** 
(.009) 
.195* 
(.02) 
.15* 
(.04) 
.23** 
(.017) 
.29** 
(.03) 
R2 .0085 .0116 .017 .1157 .0191 .0121 
*p<0.1, **P<.01 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: standard error in parenthesis 
(CM) = Competitive Margins 
    (IC) = Incumbent Challenged 
NME,SD,MT = 7120, NAZ,FL,ID = 5065, NCT,MD,WA = 7428 
 
By setting the funding threshold so low, Maine is essentially incentivizing uncompetitive 
candidates, who would struggle raising the requisite money if the threshold was higher.  These 
candidates stand no chance against an entrenched incumbent as evidenced by the fact that the 
public financing coefficient for challenged incumbents is larger than the competitive margins 
coefficient.  After the implementation of public financing in Maine there was a 5% increase in 
the likelihood that an incumbent would face a challenger and only a slight decrease in margins, 
indicating that more, low quality challengers, were in fact being incentivized to mount a 
challenge.  There are more challengers running against incumbents in Maine, which is a critical 
goal of public financing, however that does not necessarily translate into more incumbents losing 
or at least winning by smaller margins, which is the one of purported endgames of public 
financing.   
 Another reason behind Maine’s relatively poor performance is the state’s lack of a 
professionalized legislature.  Maine’s legislature ranks 43rd out of the 50 states in the Squire 
                                                          
8 See appendix 1 
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Professionalism Index.  The implication of this is that the seats are far less costly than they are in 
Arizona (which ranks as 10th) or Connecticut (19th).  This is because is it difficult to have a full-
time career as a legislator in Maine’s state assembly due to the lack of pay and obligation to the 
legislative body.  This is opens the gate for a varied composition of candidates to enter the race, 
not all of them the most capable (or serious) at successfully challenging incumbents.  Because 
the cost of a seat is low in Maine, it makes full public financing almost unnecessary.  Advertising 
and campaigning costs can easily be covered by even the paltry sums of money that can be raised 
by grassroots fundraising in state elections.  If Maine were to professionalize its legislature by 
paying its members more, and demanding additional time from them it is conceivable that more 
serious competitors would be encouraged to step into races.  However, as indicated by the 
general regression above, more professional legislatures tend to produce more entrenched 
incumbents.  It is in this scenario that full public financing could be a legitimate answer to the 
electoral competition deficit, as thresholds could be higher, due to the higher price of a seat, and 
only viable candidates who can raise that requisite amount money could then be given public 
funding in order to successfully challenge the well-financed incumbents have a significant 
advantage in these professionalized legislatures.  
 Table 5 shows the time series estimates for the individual clean election states.  It appears 
that Connecticut has received the most benefit, in terms of competition, from the implementation 
of their clean election laws in 2008.  The models indicates that was on average 10% reduction in 
the margins as well as 9% increase in the number of incumbents who faced a major part 
challenger in their races for reelection after public financing was implemented.  However, these 
effects are likely to be overestimated as there are only two years of election data available for 
Connecticut’s public financing program.  These effects could be some other external factor that 
the model fails to account for, and more time and data are needed in order to make affirmative 
conclusions about the effects of Connecticut’s program, especially because the results here are so 
large as to call into question the validity of this model’s study of Connecticut.   
 
Tables 5. Regression Analysis Predicting Competition in the Clean Election States 
 Maine Arizona Connecticut 
(CM) (IC) (CM) (IC) (CM) (IC) 
Public Financing .02* 
(.012) 
.019 
(.014) 
.05** 
(.01) 
.086** 
(.04) 
.1** 
(.013) 
.09** 
(.014) 
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Chamber .003 
(.008) 
-.02 
(.004) 
.32 
(.01) 
.32** 
(.004) 
.04** 
(.013) 
.035* 
(.014) 
Party Control -.15* 
(.06) 
.02 
(.07) 
-.23* 
(.11) 
-.28* 
(.01) 
-.36** 
(.06) 
-.35** 
(.067) 
Presidential Coattails -.01 
(.015) 
-.03* 
(.016) 
.008 
(.01) 
.07* 
(.004) 
-.01 
(.015) 
-.014 
(.016) 
Intercept .23** 
(.017) 
.004** 
(.04) 
.195* 
(.02) 
.15* 
(.04) 
.23** 
(.017) 
.29** 
(.03) 
R2 .0033 .0017 .017 .1157 .0191 .0121 
*p<0.1, **P<.01 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: standard error in parenthesis 
(CM) = Competitive Margins 
    (IC) = Incumbent Challenged 
NME = 2946, NAZ = 1397, NCT = 3594 
 
However, there currently are a number of indications that Connecticut’s program has been 
successful due to the very high candidate participation rates.  Connecticut also has a very high 
minimum threshold of contributions that a candidate must raise in order to qualify for funding, 
indicating that there are an abundance of high quality challengers, who are able to raise the 
requisite sums of money needed to win a seat in Connecticut’s highly professional state 
legislature.  It is also important to note here that Maine’s program does not achieve the level of 
statistical significance that the other two state’s achieve with their programs (p<0.01).  This 
could potentially be due to money’s lack of role in building an incumbency advantage in Maine, 
and this would result in public financing’s null effects.   
 
Results for the Partial Public Financing States 
 
 The three partial funding states in this study are Hawaii, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.  The 
results estimating competition in these elections since 1996 are shown in table 6.  Public 
campaign financing’s strongest effects can be seen coming from Minnesota’s partial financing 
system.  The model for competitive margins indicates a 7 percent reduction in margins compared 
to states that have similar legislative systems and demographics.  There are also 4% more 
incumbents being challenged in Minnesota than in Iowa or Oregon.   The increased levels of 
competition could be explained by Minnesota’s popular voter rebate program as well as the very 
high participation rates in Minnesota’s program.   
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Table 6. Regression Analysis Predicting Competition in the Partial Financing Groups 
 HI, AK, CO MN, OR, IA WI, NY, MI 
(CM) (IC) (CM) (IC) (CM) (IC) 
Public Financing .003 
(.015) 
.02 
(.016) 
.07** 
(.006) 
.04** 
(.006) 
.013* 
(.007) 
.03** 
(.008) 
Chamber .01 
(.01) 
.03* 
(.01) 
.01* 
(.005) 
.019** 
(.006) 
.027** 
(.009) 
.009 
(.01) 
Party Control -.13** 
(.03) 
-.082** 
(.03) 
-.16** 
(.02) 
-.05* 
(.02) 
.08* 
(.043) 
-.008 
(.04) 
Presidential Coattails -.01 
(.01) 
-.037** 
(.013) 
-.008 
(.006) 
.013* 
(.007) 
-.009 
(.009) 
.06** 
(.01) 
Intercept .23** 
(.02) 
.16** 
(.02) 
.21** 
(.006) 
.12** 
(.007) 
.21** 
(.007) 
.15** 
(.008) 
R2 .016 .0062 .02 .01 .002 .0065 
*p<0.1, **P<.01 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: standard error in parenthesis 
(CM) = Competitive Margins 
    (IC) = Incumbent Challenged 
N HI,AK,CO = 3562, NWI,NY,MI = 7073, NMN,OR,IA = 12704 
 
Minnesota also has a very balanced partisan make-up.  The number for seats occupied by 
Republicans and Democrats in the state legislature has been nearly even since 1994 indicating a 
higher likelihood for more competitive races to occur.  While there are still solid Republic and 
Democratic districts in Minnesota, there are a greater percentage of toss-up districts than 
elsewhere meaning that challengers are going to be more capable of successfully running against 
an incumbent leading to higher average levels of competition in the state. 
 Wisconsin’s program is relatively weak as the state’s program leads to a relatively low 
1.3% decrease in competitive margins when compared New York and Michigan.  This is likely 
due to the fact that funding was severely cut in 2007 which rendered the program unable to 
disburse the requisite amounts of financing to candidates.  In addition to this Wisconsin’s 
program has an incredibly low candidate participation rate.  The main reason behind candidate’s 
abstention from the program is due to the fact that the spending limits that publically financed 
candidates have to subject themselves to have not changed since 1986.  As Wisconsin has 
become a far more professionalized legislature since the 1980’s as well as the fact that 
advertising and campaigning costs have generally risen since then, candidates can longer 
successfully mount a campaign at such low spending levels.  
 Hawaii’s partial funding system, as hypothesized, appears to be the weakest of all six 
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public financing programs. This is likely due to the lack of funding that Hawaii’s program 
receives as well as the very low amount of money that candidates who qualify for funding 
receive.  Hawaii also has a highly professionalized state legislature and, subsequently, a higher 
cost of a seat (salaries for Hawaii’s legislators are among the highest in the nation).  This 
indicates that existence of such a weak and underfunded system can come nowhere near to the 
ability to mitigate that incumbency advantage that legislators in Hawaii are able to obtain.  
Further evidence of Hawaii’s ineffective campaign finance program can be seen in Table 7.  The 
estimate for competitive margins came nowhere close statistical significance with a p-value of 
0.943.  However incumbents where challenged on average 6% more often after the 
implementation of Hawaii’s public financing program which indicates that Hawaii’s program 
does in fact subsidize low-quality challengers who cannot win against well entrenched 
incumbents, let alone lose by competitive (60-40%) margins.     
 
Table 7. Regression Analysis Predicting Competition in Hawaii 
  Competitive 
Margins 
Incumbent 
Challenged 
Public Financing  -.002 
(.03) 
 .06** 
(.003) 
Chamber .000 
(.02) 
 .036 
(.02) 
Party Control -.161** 
(.06) 
 -.09 
(.06) 
Presidential 
Coattails  
-.01 
(.02) 
 -.042* 
(.023) 
Intercept 
 
.25** 
(.04) 
 .167** 
(.04) 
R2 .016  .01 
*p<0.1, **P<.01 (two-tailed tests) 
Note: standard error in parenthesis 
N=1096 
 
 It seems, after a more careful analysis of the data, that the initial conclusion, which 
claimed that partial financing was more successful in promoting competition than full financing 
program, was in fact misleading.  By using states that differed little along demographic, partisan, 
and legislative qualities the differences between these alternate types of financing program 
became more apparent.  This highlights and overcomes the issue with the extant comparative 
literature on public financing.  By comparing a single public financing state against the rest of 
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the U.S. states, distortions come into effect due to the simple fact that there is so much deviation 
between states.  This study has managed to control for those effects and has provided a clearer 
picture of how different types of public financing systems have impacted competition.  This is by 
no means the end all be all study on public financing due to the fact that there are still relatively 
large discrepancies between the qualities of the comparison states (can we really compare 
Wisconsin’s legislature to New York’s?).  However this study is at least comparing apples to 
oranges and not apples to automobiles.  The matching system employed by this study overcomes 
much of the difficulties encountered by previous studies, while at the same time laying a 
foundation for further, and more instructive, comparative analysis to take place. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 Public campaign financing alone is by no means the clear cut cure for America’s electoral 
woes.  This study has shown that certain public campaigning financing regimes only work in 
certain contexts and reformers need to be aware of this.  A lot of studies have analyzed a public 
financing system in a certain state or municipality; and have argued that such a system could 
work on the national level.  This author would not be so bold as to identify the program that 
would be best suited for application to federal or presidential elections simply because of the 
issues of differing contexts and generalizing.  It was observed that more professionalized 
legislatures tend to do better with systems of full financing as in Connecticut and Arizona, 
whereas the partial funding systems failed to produce gains in these less professional legislatures.   
 Entire volumes of scholarly research exist attempting to both define and explicate what a 
healthy level of competition looks like in an electoral system. To say that electoral competition is 
key to democratic legitimacy cannot be seen as controversial.  As Fenno observes: "as long as 
representatives want to retain office, the knowledge that they will later be held accountable at the 
polls will tend to make their representative behavior more responsive to the desires of their 
constituents" (1978, 233). However, it is no question that competition can also lead to perverse 
electoral outcomes as was seen with Hawaii’s subsidization of uncompetitive candidates. It is 
clear that a balance of sorts must be struck between legitimizing the democratic qualities of a 
system and preventing antimajoritarian outcomes when attempting to foster competition in an 
election. A system implementing public campaign financing must be fairly restrictive and 
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discerning as to who receives funding so as not to dilute the field with uncompetitive, but well-
financed candidates. 
 The conclusions found by this study do tend to support the findings of authors like 
Malhotra (2008) and Mayer (1995) rather than those of Samples (2006) or Levitt (1994) in that 
evidence is found which supports public campaign financing’s ability to foster higher levels of 
competition evidence that public campaign financing can in fact lead to more competitive 
outcomes in elections when implemented correctly.  However, this finding should not necessarily 
encourage the wholesale implementation of public financing systems across the country.  A 
number of programs and certain provision contained within have recently been ruled as 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, including the “catch-up funds” that were considered an 
integral part of the clean elections systems in Maine, Arizona, and Connecticut.  Unfortunately 
not enough time has passed since that ruling, which occurred in 2011, for its potential effects to 
be contained within the data used by this study.  Further research needs to be done in order to 
understand how these legal implications are impacting public financing reforms.  However, one 
thing is clear, and that is the legacy of Buckley v. Valeo, and the legal precedent it established, 
continues to play a vital role in American democracy and any future reforms must be aware and 
considerate of that fact. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Characteristics of Public Finance Programs 
Source: Mayer, Kenneth R., Timothy Werner, and Amanda Williams (2006, 248) 
 
 Arizona Maine Connecticut Hawaii Wisconsin Minnesota 
Date Effective 2000 2000 2008 1996 1978 1976 
Program Type Clean 
Elections 
Clean 
Election 
Clean 
Elections 
Matching 
Grants 
Fixed Subsidy Fixed Subsidy 
Qualifications Raise $1,050 
in qualifying 
contributions 
($5 each) 
Raise $250 
in qualifying 
contributions 
($750 for the 
Senate) ($5 
each) 
Raise $5000 
($15,000 
Senate) in 
qualifying 
contributions 
($5-$100 
each) 
Raise $1500 
(House or 
$2500 
(Senate) 
Win primary 
with at least 
6% of the 
total vote for 
office. Raise 
threshold 
amount in 
$100 dollar 
contributions. 
Raise $1500 
($3000 
Senate) in 
qualifying 
contributions 
(<$100 each) 
Maximum 
Grant 
Up to the 
spending limit 
– Bonus funds 
against 
privately 
funded 
candidates 
Up to the 
spending 
limit – Bonus 
funds against 
privately 
funded 
candidates  
$80,550 for 
Senate  
$26,850 for 
House 
Grant 
restricted to 
15% of the 
spending 
limit 
$15,525 for 
Senate 
$7,763 for 
Assembly 
(General 
Elections 
Only) 
Up to 50% of 
spending 
limit. Small 
contribution 
refund 
program - up 
to $50 rebate 
for donors 
Spending 
Limits 
$28,300 for 
primary and 
general 
elections 
$4,406 for 
primary and 
general 
elections 
($23,278 for 
the Senate) 
Limited to the 
required 
amount of 
qualifying 
contributions 
$1.40 x the 
number of 
registered 
voters in the 
district 
2004 
$17,250 for 
Assembly  
$34,500 for 
Senate Limits 
(unchanged 
since 1986) 
$34,100 for 
the House 
$64,866 for 
Senate 
(Separate 
limits for non-
presidential 
election 
years) 
Unique 
Conditions 
Unopposed 
candidates not 
eligible for 
public funds 
Nonparticip-
ating 
candidates 
face 
additional 
reporting 
requirements 
Candidates 
with higher 
public support 
(signatures) 
receive more 
funding 
  Spending 
limits waived 
when non-
participating 
candidate 
exceed 
threshold 
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Appendix 2: Characteristics of State Legislatures 
 
Sources: 
National Conference of State Legislatures (2009)  
National Conference of State Legislatures (2012)  
Empire Center (2012) 
Squire (2007) 
 
 
 
 Arizona Maine Connecticut Hawaii Wisconsin Minnesota 
Office SEN H SEN H SEN H SEN H SEN H SEN H 
Average District 
Size (thousands 
of people) 
171 85 36.4 8.4 94.5 22.5 48.4 23.7 162.5 54.1 73.4 36.7 
Number of Seats 30 60 35 150 36 151 25 51 33 99 67 134 
Term Limits 
(effective year) 
8 
(2000) 
8 
(2000) 
8 
(1996) 
8 
(1996) 
- - - - - - - - 
Annual Base 
Salary (2012) 
$24,000 $13,852 $28,000 $46,272 $49,943 $31,141 
Total Staff 
During Session 
(2009) 
701 211 617 707 640 
 
723 
Professionalism 
(2003) 
.232 .089 .19 .225 .439 .169 
